The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process
Volume 3

Issue 1

Article 6

2001

Make Way for the ABA: Smith v. Robbins Clears a Path for Anders
Alternatives
James E. Duggan
Andrew W. Moeller

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the
Fourteenth Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
James E. Duggan and Andrew W. Moeller, Make Way for the ABA: Smith v. Robbins Clears a Path for
Anders Alternatives, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 65 (2001).
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess/vol3/iss1/6

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has
been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process by an authorized administrator of
Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu.

THE JOURNAL OF
APPELLATE PRACTICE
AND PROCESS
ARTICLES
MAKE WAY FOR THE ABA: SMITH v. ROBBINS
CLEARS A PATH FOR ANDERS ALTERNATIVES
James E. Duggan* and Andrew W. Moeller**
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth

Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right,
enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the record,
research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his
behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a
preliminary determination that his case is without merit, is
forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the record is
unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a

meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful
appeal.

-Justice

Douglas in Douglas v. California'
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INTRODUCTION

In Douglas, the United States Supreme Court held that
under the Fourteenth Amendment, indigents appealing their
criminal convictions are entitled to court-appointed counsel.2
Whether this holding was based on the Due Process or Equal
Protection Clause has never been clarified.3 It is clear, however,
that the Court's underlying concern in Douglas was that the
appeal would be a "meaningless ritual" for an indigent who is
forced to be his own advocate. By contrast, "[a] rich man...
[would] enjoy [ ] the benefits of counsel's examination into the
record, research
of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his
4
behalf."
Left open by Douglas was the difficult issue concerning the
level of representation required and the proper scope of
counsel's role when an indigent defendant's appeal is devoid of
any arguable issues. In Anders v. California,5 the Court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to erect safeguards to
protect an indigent's right to effective counsel on appeal even if
the appeal is frivolous. The Court went on to prescribe a
seemingly solitary procedure intended to protect an indigent's
constitutional rights.6 Implementation of Anders was
subsequently explained in McCoy v. Court of Appeals of
Wisconsin7 and Penson v. Ohio.8 However, the question of
whether states are obligated to follow Anders as the exclusive
procedure for withdrawal of appellate counsel has never been
clearly resolved.9 Most recently, in Smith v. Robbins,'° the Court
2. Id. at 357.
3. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974).
4. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358.

5. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
6. Id. at 744.

7. 486 U.S. 429 (1988).
8. 488 U.S. 75 (1988).
9. The authors would like to note the articles produced by other commentators who
have previously grappled with this and other issues raised by the Court's decision in
Anders. See e.g. Jack M. Bains, Student Author, Termination of the Attorney-Client
Relationship: How FarMust Anders Compliance Go? 16 J. Legal Prof. 229 (1991); James
J. Doherty, Wolf' Wolf' The Ramifications of Frivolous Appeals, 59 J. Crim. L.

Criminology & Police Sci. I (1968); Robert Hermann, Frivolous Criminal Appeals, 47
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 701 (1972); Frederick D. Junkin, The Right to Counsel in "Frivolous"
CriminalAppeals: A Reevaluation of the Guarantees of Anders v. California, 67 Tex. L.

MAKE WAY FOR THE ABA

changed its tack by substantially modifying Anders to allow

states considerable leeway in devising procedural schemes for
frivolous appeals." In none of these cases has the Court
considered a different approach to this issue-like the approach
first suggested by the American Bar Association ("ABA")
Standards for Criminal Justice in 1967 and later referred to as
the "Idaho Rule." 2 This approach has been formally adopted or
followed de facto by a significant number of states.' 3
This article is written in three parts. Part I sets forth
summaries of the Court's decisions in Anders, McCoy, Penson,
and Smith in an effort to provide the reader with a foundation for
the forthcoming discussion. Part II analyzes these cases and

argues that the Court's most recent decision in Smith is a
significant departure from Anders, McCoy, and Penson, in that it
permits states to abandon the Anders procedure in favor of other
equal safeguards. Part III describes the historical development of
the procedure suggested by the ABA Standards (the Idaho Rule),
evaluates that procedure, and argues that it overcomes many of
the deficiencies of Anders.

Rev. 181 (1988); Arthur Mendelson, Frivolous Criminal Appeals: The Anders Brief or the
Idaho Rule? 19 Crim. L. Bull. 22 (Jan.-Feb. 1983); Charles Pengilly, Never Cry Anders:
The Ethical Dilemma of Counsel Appointed to Pursue a Frivolous Criminal Appeal, 9
Crim. Just. J. 45 (1986); Deborah Pines, Second Circuit Court Defines Standards for
"Anders" Briefs, 208 N.Y. L.J. 1 (Dec. 10, 1992); Deborah Pines, Circuit Sees Rise in
Volume of Anders Briefs, 208 N.Y. L.J. 1 (Oct. 8, 1992); A.C. Pritchard, Auctioning
Justice: Legal and Market Mechanismsfor Allocating CriminalAppellate Counsel, 34 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 1161, 1168 (1997); Peter C. Ray, Student Author, Frivolous Appeals and the
Minimum Standards Project: Solution or Surrender? 24 U. Miami L. Rev. 95 (1969);
Martha C. Warner, Anders in the Fifty States: Some Appellants' Equal Protection is More
Equal than Others', 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 625 (1996).
10. 528 U.S. 259 (2000).
11. Id. at 272.
12. This approach was named the Idaho Rule in reference to the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision in State v. McKenney, 568 P.2d 1213 (Idaho 1977).
13. See infra n. 211.
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I. OVERVIEW

A. Anders v. California
1. Background
Charlie Anders was convicted of felony possession of
marijuana and sought appellate review and appointment of
counsel from the California District Court of Appeal. 4 The court
granted Anders's requests and assigned counsel to represent
him.'5 However, upon review of the record, court-appointed
counsel concluded that Anders's appeal lacked merit and
advised the court 6 as such. 7 Anders, for his part, wished to

pursue his appeal despite the loss of counsel. He again requested
that the court provide him with an attorney, but his request was
denied.' Undaunted, Anders continued pro se, filing his
appellate brief and a reply brief without the assistance of
counsel. 9 Thereafter, the court unanimously affirmed Anders's
conviction.S°
Nearly six years later, Anders sought to reopen his original
case with the California District Court of Appeal by way of a
writ of habeas corpus. In his writ, Anders argued that he was
deprived of his right to counsel on his initial appeal after the
court refused to appoint him an attorney.2 ' The court denied
Anders's writ, stating that it had again reviewed Anders's case
14. People v. Anders, 333 P.2d 854, 855 (Cal. Dist. App. 1959). The California District

Court of Appeal is now the California Court of Appeal.
15. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 739 (1967).
16. The Court's decision contains the following excerpt from Anders's counsel's letter
to the California court:
I will not file a brief on appeal as I am of the opinion that there is no merit to the
appeal. I have visited and communicated with Mr. Anders and have explained
my views and opinions to him .... [H]e wishes to file a brief in this matter on
his own behalf.
Id. at 742.
17. Anders, 333 P.2d at 856.
18. Anders, 386 U.S. at 740.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 740.
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and found it to be without merit." Likewise, the Supreme Court
of California, without opinion, denied Anders's second petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.23 In doing so, it did not address
Anders's contention that both the trial judge and the prosecutor
inappropriately commented on his failure to testify at trial in
violation of Griffin v. California.
The United States Supreme Court granted Anders's petition
for certiorari,25 but did not take up Anders's claim that
inappropriate comments had been made concerning his failure to
testify at trial. Rather, the Court limited its review to "the extent
of the duty of a court-appointed appellate counsel to prosecute a
first appeal from a criminal conviction, after that attorney has
conscientiously determined
that there is no merit to the
26
indigent's appeal."

2. The Court's Decision
Justice Clark, who dissented in Douglas, delivered the
opinion of the Court. In Part I of the decision, the Court briefly
retraced its past jurisprudence pertaining to an indigent
appellant's rights on appeal. 27 Citing Griffin v. Illinois,2Douglas
29
v. California, Johnson v. United States, ° and Ellis v. United

22. See id.
23. Id. at 740-41.
24. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 741 (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)
(holding that comment on a defendant's failure to testify violates the self-incrimination
clause of the Fifth Amendment)).
25. The question presented by Anders's certiorari petition read as follows:
May a State appellate court refuse to provide counsel to brief and argue an
indigent criminal defendant's first appeal as of right on the basis of a conclusory
statement by the appointed attorney on appeal that the case has no merit and that

he will file no brief?
McCoy v. Wis. Ct. App., 486 U.S. 429,439 n. 11 (1988).
26. Anders, 386 U.S. at 739.
27. Id. at 741-42.
28. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requiring that indigent appellants be provided free transcripts
on appeal).
29. 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
30. 352 U.S. 565 (1957) (per curiam) (requiring appointment of counsel when a
defendant challenges a federal district court's determination that his appeal is not being
taken in good faith).
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States,3 the Court reaffirmed its previous pronouncements that
procedures correlating the nature and scope of appellate review
with the appellant's wealth are constitutionally infirm. 2 That is,
distinctions based on wealth which operate to decrease or restrict
the effectiveness of an indigent's right to counsel on appeal are
impermissible. With the stage set, the Court moved to Part II of
its opinion to examine the constitutionality of California's
procedure as applied to Anders.
The Court found that Anders's court-appointed counsel's
bare conclusion that his appeal lacked merit was insufficient to
satisfy Anders's right to counsel on appeal.33 Presumably this is
because the Court felt Anders was, at most, only afforded the
limited benefit of amicus curiae rather than the constitutionally
required full-blown assistance of a zealous advocate prescribed
in Ellis.34 The Court equated the treatment Anders received to
that received by the defendant in Eskridge v. Washington State
Board,35 who was refused a trial transcript after the trial judge
unilaterally determined that he had received an impartial trial
free from R rejudicial error.36 This procedure was condemned by
the Court.
Notably, the Anders Court focused on the fact that none of
the California courts reviewing Anders's appeal ever made a
frivolity finding. 8 The California District Court of Appeal stated
that Anders's case was "without merit," and the Supreme Court
of California failed to comment at all on the frivolity, or not, of
Anders's appeal. The Court found that Anders's appeal was
never deemed frivolous, yet he still was denied representation
beyond that of an amici.39 As such, the Court concluded that
31. 356 U.S. 674 (1958) (per curiam) (requiring that counsel appointed to an indigent
appellant serve as an advocate, as opposed to an amicus curiae).
32. Anders, 386 U.S. at 741-42.
33. See id. at 742; see also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (requiring
appointment of counsel for indigent appellants on their first appeal as of right).
34. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 743.
35. 357 U.S. 214, 215 (1957) (per curiam) (holding Washington's procedure
authorizing a trial judge to furnish an indigent defendant with a trial transcript at public
expense "if in his opinion justice will thereby be promoted" to be a violation of Griffin v.
Illinois, which requires that indigent appellants be provided free transcripts for appeal).
36. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 742.
37. See Eskridge, 357 U.S. at 216.

38. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 743.
39. See id.
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"California's procedure did not furnish [Anders] with counsel
acting in the role of an advocate nor did it provide that full
consideration and resolution of the matter as is obtained when
counsel is acting in that capacity.
In the final section of the Court's decision, Justice Clark
crafted a new procedure to satisfy the Court's principle that
"[t]he constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair
process can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an
active advocate on behalf of his client, as opposed to that of
amicus curiae." 4 ' The Court described the procedure as follows:
Counsel should, and can with honor and without conflict,
be of more assistance to his client and to the court. His role
as advocate requires that he support his client's appeal to
the best of his ability. Of course, if counsel finds his case to
be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it,
he should so advise the court and request permission to
withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by
a brief referring to anything in the record that might
arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel's brief
should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him to
raise any points that he chooses; the court-not counselthen proceeds, after a full examination of all the
proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.
If it so finds it may grant counsel's request to withdraw and
dismiss the appeal insofar as federal requirements are
concerned, or proceed to a decision on the merits, if state
law so requires. On the other hand, if it finds any of the
legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not
frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the
assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.42
And thus, the "Anders brief' was born. The Court stated
that its new procedure would "afford [the indigent defendant]
that advocacy which a nonindigent defendant is able to obtain"
and would "induce the court to pursue all the more vigorously
its own review because of the ready references not only to the
40. Id. The Court went on to note that at least one of Anders's grounds for appeal may
well have been meritorious, had a motivated advocate assisted him in raising it on appeal.
In Griffin, the Court held California's rule permitting comment on a defendant's failure to
testify unconstitutional, an argument Anders failed to raise in his initial appeal, but cited in
his petition for certiorari filed after Griffin was decided. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 741-43.
41. Id. at 744.
42. Id.
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record, but also to the legal authorities as furnished it by
counsel., 43 The Court's final proclamation, however, best
illustrates the underlying principle that Anders attempted to
reinforce: "This procedure will assure penniless defendants the
same rights and opportunities on appeal-as nearly as
practicable-as are enjoyed by those persons who are in a
similar situation but who are able to afford the retention of
private counsel." 44
3. The Dissent
Justice Stewart penned the dissenting opinion, which
Justices Black and Harlan joined. The short dissent expressed
the dissenters' puzzlement over the majority's seemingly
oxymoronic mandate that appellate counsel file a brief detailing
conceivable appeal issues, while at the same time requesting to
withdraw after deeming the appeal to be wholly frivolous.4 As
the dissenters pointed out, "if the record did present any such
'arguable' issues, the appeal would not be frivolous and counsel
would not have filed a 'no-merit' letter in the first place." 46 This
logic is difficult to deny, but it did not carry the day in Anders,
nor did it prevent the Court's holding in McCoy, which allowed
states to put defense counsel in an even more self-contradictory
posture.
B. McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
1. Background
Sixteen years after Anders was decided, a Wisconsin trial
judge found Ellis T. McCoy guilty of abduction and sexual
assault and sentenced him to twelve years in prison for his
misdeeds. 47 From that conviction, McCoy filed an appeal, and
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 745 (citation omitted).
Id.
See id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quotations in original).
See McCoy v. Wis. Ct. App., 486 U.S. 429, 431 (1988) (McCoy II). McCoy was

convicted in Milwaukee County Circuit Court on December 2, 1983, McCoy v. Wis. Ct.
App., 403 N.W.2d 449,450 (Wis. App. 1987) (McCoy I), aft'd, 486 U.S. 429 (1988).
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the court appointed counsel to represent him.4 ' After his attorney
informed him that pursuing an appeal would be futile, McCoy
elected to have his attorney file a brief presenting his strongest
arguments, yet at the same time advising the court that counsel49
deemed the appeal frivolous-in essence, an Anders brief.
McCoy's attorney filed the brief, which the Court characterized
as "schizophrenic," 5 0 but refused to include a discussion of the
reasons why he found no merit in McCoy's appeal, as required
by the Wisconsin Rules of Appellate Procedure.5" McCoy's
attorney explained to the court that he regarded compliance with
the discussion requirement of the appellate rule to be unethical
and a violation of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Anders." The court, unpersuaded, directed McCoy's attorney to

48. See McCoy 11, 486 U.S. at 431.
49. See id. at 431-32; see also McCoy 1, 403 N.W.2d at 450-51.
50. McCoy H, 486 U.S. at 432. The Court stated:
In his role as an advocate for appellant, counsel stated the facts, advanced four
arguments for reversal, and prayed that the conviction be set aside. In his role as
an officer of the court, counsel stated that further appellate proceedings on behalf
of his client "would be frivolous and without any arguable merit," and prayed
that he be permitted to withdraw. Thus, in the same document, the lawyer
purported to maintain that there were arguments warranting a reversal and also
that those arguments were wholly without merit.
Id.
51. See McCoy 11, 486 U.S. at 432; see also McCoy 1, 403 N.W.2d at 450-51. At the
time of the decision, Rule 809.32 of the Wisconsin Rules of Appellate Procedure read:
Rule (No merit reports) (1). If an attorney appointed under section 809.30 or ch.
977 is of the opinion that further appellate proceedings on behalf of the
defendant would be frivolous and without any arguable merit within the meaning
of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the attorney shall file with the
court of appeals 3 copies of a brief in which is stated anything in the record that
might arguably support the appeal and a discussion of why the issue lacks merit.
The attorney shall serve a copy of the brief on the defendant and shall file a
statement in the court of appeals that service has been made upon the defendant.
The defendant may file a response to the brief within 30 days of service.
McCoy 11, 486 U.S. at 430-31.
52. The Court's decision in McCoy contains the following excerpt from McCoy's
counsel's brief:
Counsel would no longer be an advocate, as required by Anders, but would be in
the awkward position of arguing why his client's appeal lacks merit. This would
be contrary to the mandate of Anders that the attorney not brief the case against
the client and that the attorney act as an advocate. Since an attorney is legally
bound to represent the best interests of his or her client until relieved from
further representation by this court, defendant and this attorney submit that a
discussion of why any issue lacks merit would violate the sixth amendment.
Id. at 432 n. 2 (citations omitted).
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file a conforming brief, which he refused to do.53 McCoy's
counsel instead sought a ruling on the constitutionality of the
appellate rule from first the intermediary appellate court, and
then by way of original action for a declaratory judgment in the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.5 4 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
found the appellate rule to be constitutional, stating, "While
Anders does not sanction the use of the discussion requirement,
it does not proscribe it, either."55 McCoy then brought his
constitutional challenge to the United States Supreme Court.
2. The Court's Decision
Relying on both the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
interpretation of the requirements of the appellate rule56 and the
ethical standards attorneys are charged with obeying, 7 the Court,
through Justice Stevens, found that Wisconsin's rule bred no
denial of the effective assistance of counsel. This, however, was
not the thrust of McCoy's argument. As the Court noted,

53. Id. at 432.
54. Id. at 432-33; see also McCoy I, 403 N.W.2d at 450-51.
55. McCoy 1,403 N.W.2d at 452.
56. See McCoy II, 486 U.S. at 440. The Court relied on the following excerpt from the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision:
We interpret the discussion rule to require a statement of reasons why the appeal
lacks merit which might include, for example, a brief summary of any case or
statutory authority which appears to support the attorney's conclusions, or a
synopsis of those facts in the record which might compel reaching the same
result. We do not contemplate the discussion rule to require an attorney to
engage in a protracted argument in favor of the conclusion reached; rather, we
view the rule as an attempt to provide the court with "notice" that there are facts
on record or cases or statutes on point which would seem to compel a conclusion
of no merit.
McCoy I, 403 N.W.2d at 454.
57. See McCoy II, 486 U.S. at 440-41. The Court cited Rule 3.3(a) of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (1984), which provided in part:
A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(I) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not
disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.
Id. at 441 n. 14.
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The aspect of the Rule that has provoked the concern of
counsel for petitioner and other members of the defense bar
is that which calls for the attorney to reveal the basis for his
or her judgment [that the appeal lacks merit]."
McCoy argued that requiring appellate counsel to go beyond
simply informing the court that counsel deems the appellant's
appeal meritless and actually provide the reasons for, and a
discussion of, the basis for counsel's finding violated an
appellant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and was
contrary to Anders.59 The Court, however, found nothing
objectionable about Wisconsin's rule.
Recognizing that its ruling in Anders created minimum
requirements for safeguarding an appellant's rights, the Court
found that Wisconsin's appellate rule simply furthered the
objectives of Anders by requiring appellate counsel to take an
extra step and provide additional written evidence of his review
of the appellant's case.6 ° As the Court explained:
Instead of relying on an unexplained assumption that the
attorney has discovered law or facts that completely refute
the arguments identified in the brief, the Wisconsin court
requires additional evidence of counsel's diligence. 6'
The Court rationalized that requiring a written analysis from
appellate counsel may jar previously undiscovered arguments
and prevent counsel from drawing "mistaken conclusions... 62
that the strongest arguments he or she can find are frivolous."
In this regard, the Court found Wisconsin's appellate rule in
keeping with the purpose of the Anders brief, 63 which is to assure

58. Id.at441.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 442.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. The Court stated that the Anders brief is intended to assist an appellate court as it
adjudicates a motion to withdraw. According to the Court,
First, [the appellate court] must satisfy itself that the attorney has provided the
client with a diligent and thorough search of the record for any arguable claim
that might support the client's appeal. Second, it must determine whether
counsel has correctly concluded that the appeal is frivolous. Because the mere
statement of such a conclusion by counsel in Anders was insufficient to allow the
court to make the required determination, we held that the attorney was required
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the court that the appellant's constitutional rights have not been
violated. 6'
The Court rejected McCoy's argument that Wisconsin's
rule places appellate counsel in the position of amicus curiae, 5
and it was unpersuaded that the rule infringed upon an indigent
defendant's right to effective representation and due process on
appeal.66 The Court succinctly stated, "A supported conclusion
that the appeal is frivolous does not implicate Sixth or
Fourteenth Amendment concerns to any greater extent than does
a bald conclusion., 67 And with that, the Court affirmed the
Wisconsin Supreme Court and upheld the Wisconsin appellate
rule.68
3. The Dissent
Led by Justice Brennan, the dissenters voiced their
opinion that the Wisconsin rule impinged upon McCoy's right to
counsel and passively encouraged inequity between rich and
poor.7° In the dissenters' view, the Wisconsin rule did not
preserve appellate counsel's singular role as an advocate.
Instead, the appellate rule impermissibly thrust appellate counsel
into a dual role as advocate and amicus curiae.7' Drawing a
parallel between the discussion requirement of Wisconsin's rule
and the no-merit brief the Court struck down in Ellis, the
to submit for the court's consideration references to anything in the record that
might arguably support the appeal.
Id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 443.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined in Justice Brennan's dissent. Justice
Kennedy took no part in the decision. See id.
70. See id. at 451 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
71. The dissenters characterized their position by explaining,
Our disagreement boils down to whether defense counsel who details for a court
why she believes her client's appeal is frivolous befriends the client or the court.
The Court looks at Wisconsin's regime and sees a friend of the client who
"assur[es] that the constitutional rights of indigent defendants are scrupulously
honored." I look at the same regime and see a friend of the court whose
advocacy is so damning that the prosecutor never responds.
Id. at 455 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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dissenters stated, "No less than the no-merit briefs we
disapproved in Ellis, the no-merit discussion undermines the
'very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice."'"72
The dissenters were also troubled by what they perceived to
be inequity between rich and poor resulting from compliance
with Wisconsin's rule. They pointed out that legal minds can
and do differ on the validity of legal issues.73 As such, when a
wealthy appellant's retained counsel informs him that his appeal
is frivolous, the wealthy appellant can seek a second opinion and
retain different counsel, who may recognize the validity of his
cause.74 Not so with the indigent appellant who, after accepting
the State's offer of counsel, runs the risk that he will not only
have to combat opposing counsel, but also his own counsel if
she deems his appeal meritless.75
Like the majority, the dissenters recognized that the
Wisconsin rule required appellate counsel to take an extra step.
The dissenters, however, viewed that step as impermissible
under the Constitution:
Merely because counsel constitutionally may take slight
deviations from the role of advancing the client's undivided

interests does not mean that counsel constitutionally may
entirely abandon that role, nor even that counsel may depart
from that role any more than is absolutely necessary to
satisfy the ethical obligation.76

72. Id. at 450 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The Court went on to
conclude that "the Wisconsin Rule falls squarely within our flat prohibition against casting

defense counsel in the role of amici." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. "Legal issues do not come prepackaged with the labels 'frivolous' or 'arguably
meritorious.' ... It by no means impugns the legal profession's integrity to acknowledge

that reasonable attorneys can differ as to whether a particular issue is arguably
meritorious." Id. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. See id. at 452 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 453 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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C. Penson v. Ohio
1. Background
On December 7, 1984, an Ohio jury found Steven Anthony
Penson guilty of, among other things, fourteen counts of rape,
two counts of aggravated robbery, and two counts of felonious
assault." The court sentenced him to serve eighteen to twentyeight years at the Chillicothe Correctional Institute. After
sentencing, the court appointed appellate counsel to assist
Penson in his appeal.79
On June 2, 1986, Penson's attorney filed a "Certificate of
Meritless Appeal and Motion" with the Ohio Court of Appeals. 0
A week later the court permitted Penson's appellate counsel to
withdraw
and granted Penson additional time to file his brief pro
81
se. The court granted Penson numerous extensions of time to
file his brief, but refused to grant his request to have new
appellate counsel appointed. In the end, Penson never filed an
appellate brief."83
The Ohio Court of Appeals, after having previously
excused Penson's appellate counsel, reviewed the record and
77. See Ohio v. Penson, 1987 WL 12222 at * I (Ohio App. June 5, 1987) (per curiam).
78. See id.
79. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 77 (1988).
80. See id. at 77-78. The Court included the following text of the "Certification of
Meritless Appeal and Motion" in its decision:
Appellant's attorney respectfully certifies to the Court that he has carefully
reviewed the within record on appeal, that he has found no errors requiring
reversal, modification and/or vacation of appellant's jury trial convictions and/or
the trial court's sentence in Case No. 84-CR-1056, that he has found no errors
requiring reversal, modification and/or vacation of appellant's jury trial
convictions and/or the trial court's sentence in Case No. 84-CR-1401, and that
he will not file a meritless appeal in this matter.
MOTION
Appellant's attorney respectfully requests a Journal Entry permitting him to
withdraw as appellant's appellate attorney of record in this appeal thereby
relieving appellant's attorney of any further responsibility to prosecute this
appeal with the attorney/client relationship terminated effective on the date filestamped on this Motion.
Id. at 78.
81. See Penson, 1987 WL 12222 at *2; see also Penson, 488 U.S. at 78.
82. See Penson, 1987 WL 12222 at *2; see also Penson, 488 U.S. at 78.
83. See Penson, 1987 WL 12222 at *2; see also Penson, 488 U.S. at 78.
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found "several arguable claims," and eventually found plain
error in a portion of the jury instructions related to one count of
felonious assault." Despite expressing its disagreement with
counsel's filing of a no-merit brief, 5 .the court held that Penson
suffered no prejudice as a result of his attorney's cursory
examination of the record because the court had previously
reviewed and dismissed similar arguments raised by Penson's
co-defendants in their separate appeals.86 Penson sought review
from the Ohio Supreme Court, which summarily dismissed his
appeal.87
2. The Court's Decision
Preliminarily, the United States Supreme Court reiterated
the Anders procedure for properly permitting counsel to
withdraw from representing an indigent appellant.88 Without
hesitation or apparent difficulty, the Court found that the Ohio
Court of Appeals failed to follow the safeguard procedure
developed in Anders. Worse, the Court also found that the Ohio
procedure
denied
Penson
"constitutionally
adequate
representation" '9 when it refused to appoint him counsel after
concluding that he indeed had several arguably meritorious
grounds for reversal and modification of his sentence. 9°
Specifically examining the handling of counsel's motion to
withdraw, the Court found that the Ohio Court of Appeals erred
in two ways: first, by granting counsel's motion despite the fact
that counsel did not draw attention to any arguable appeals

84. Penson, 1987 WL 12222 at *2.
85. The Ohio Court of Appeals stated, "Initially, this court is troubled by the filing of
an Anders brief in the present action. We find counsel's claim that the record does not
reveal any assignment of error which could arguably support the appeal to be highly
questionable." Id.
86. See id. ("Because we have thoroughly examined the record and already considered
the assignments of error raised in the other defendants' appeals, we find appellant has
suffered no prejudice in his counsel's failure to give a more conscientious examination of

the record.").
87. See Penson, 488 U.S. at 79.
88. See id. at 80.
89. Id. at 8 1.
90. See id.
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grounds; 9' and second, by impermissibly deciding counsel's
motion to withdraw without first conducting its own
investigation into the merits of Penson's appeal. 92
The Court found more significant error, however, in the
Ohio court's failure to appoint new counsel after its own
investigation revealed that Penson had viable arguments on
appeal.93 As the Court noted, Anders unambiguously required
that a court appoint counsel prior to rendering a decision if it
concludes that the appellant may have arguable claims on
appeal.94 In its discussion, the Court clarified the interplay
between Anders and Douglas-identifying Anders as a limited
exception to the rule in Douglas that indigent defendants have a
.right to effective representation on their first appeal as of right. 95
The exception is predicated on the fact that the Fourteenth
Amendment-although demanding active and vigorous
appellate representation of indigent criminal defendantsdoes not demand that States require appointed counsel to
press upon their appellate courts wholly frivolous
arguments. However, once a court determines that the trial
record supports arguable claims, there is no basis for the
exception and, as provided in Douglas, the criminal
appellant is entitled to representation.
As such, the Court concluded that the court of appeals'
determination that arguable issues existed in the record created a
constitutional imperative that counsel be provided. 97
In the last portion of the majority's decision, the Court
rejected Ohio's argument that the prejudice requirement in
Strickland v. Washington 8 and the harmless-error analysis in
Chapman v. California" are applicable in cases-like
91. See id. (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (stating that counsel must identify "anything

in the record that might arguably support the appeal")).
92. See id. at 82-83.
93. See id. at 83.
94. See id.
95. See id.

96. Id. at 84.
97. See id.
98. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (requiring a defendant pursuing a Sixth Amendment
ineffective assistance of counsel claim to show that counsel's performance was deficient

and that he suffered actual prejudice as a result thereof).
99. 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (requiring findings of harmless error to be made beyond a
reasonable doubt where a federal constitutional violation has occurred).
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Penson's-where seemingly egregious violations of the Anders
procedure occur."° To hold otherwise, hypothesized the Court,
would render the protections of Anders and Douglas
meaningless because, whether the reviewing court finds a basis
for reversal or not, the indigent appellant would not be harmed.
Thus he would have no reason to complain.' °'
Nor was the Court persuaded by the State's argument that
the Ohio Court of Appeals' review of the briefs filed on behalf
of Penson's co-defendants satisfied Penson's right to
representation on appeal. "One party's right to representation on
appeal is not satisfied by simply relying on representation
provided to another party." 102 In its final rejection of the State's
contention that either Strickland prejudice analysis or Chapman
harmless-error analysis was applicable, the Court stated,
Because the fundamental importance of the assistance of
counsel does not cease as the prosecutorial process moves
from the trial to the appellate stage, the presumption of
prejudice must extend as well to the denial of counsel on
appeal.1°3

The Court reversed the judgment of the Ohio Court of Appeals
and remanded the case for further proceedings. ' °4

100. Penson, 488 U.S. at 88-89.
101. The Court stated:
Finding harmless error or a lack of Strickland prejudice in cases such as this,
however, would leave indigent criminal appellants without any of the protections
afforded by Anders. Under the State's theory, if on reviewing the bare appellate
record a court would ultimately conclude that the conviction should not be
reversed, then the indigent criminal appellant suffers no prejudice by being
denied his right to counsel. Similarly, however, if on reviewing the record the
court would find a basis for reversal, then the criminal defendant also suffers no
prejudice. In either event, the criminal appellant is not harmed and thus has no
basis for complaint. Thus, adopting the State's view would render meaningless
the protection afforded by Douglas and Anders.
Id. at 86.
102. Id. The Court further stated, "A criminal appellant is entitled to a single-minded
advocacy for which the mere possibility of a coincidence of interest with a represented
codefendant is an inadequate proxy." Id. at 87.
103. Id. at 88 (citation omitted).
104. See id. at 89.
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3. The Dissentl °5
In the opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the lone
dissenter, the majority's view impermissibly stretched the
protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment.' °6 Quoting the
Court's decision in Ross v. Moffitt, °7 Justice Rehnquist
recognized the equal protection component present in the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel on appeal. However, he took issue
with what he perceived to be the majority's attempt to permit the
state's coffers to be used to fund representation equal to that
which could be obtained by privately retained counsel.' 8
Concluding that such equality is not required, Justice Rehnquist
characterized the majority's opinion as a "futile monument to
the Court's effort to guarantee to the indigent appellant what no
court can guarantee him: exactly the same sort of legal services
that would be provided by suitably retained private counsel." '0
Justice Rehnquist also concluded that alleged violations of
Anders should be judged under the effective-assistance-ofcounsel guarantee using the Strickland analysis and that
appellants should not be afforded alternative constitutional relief
if such violations do not render counsel's representation
ineffective." °

105. It should be noted for the sake of completeness that Justice O'Connor filed a one
paragraph concurring opinion. She wrote separately to express her view that "nothing in
the Court's opinion forecloses the possibility that a mere technical violation of [Anders]
might be excusable." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
106. See id. at 90-91 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
107. 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974) ("The duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate
the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing
effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate
opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process." ).
108. See Penson, 488 U.S. at 90 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Ross, 417 U.S. at

616.
109. Penson, 488 U.S. at 90 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

I 10. See id. at 91 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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D. Smith v. Robbins
1. Background
In 1990, a California jury convicted Lee Robbins of second
degree murder and grand theft auto, for which the trial court
sentenced him to serve seventeen years to life in prison.'"
Robbins's appointed counsel concluded that filing an appeal
would be frivolous and therefore submitted a brief complying
with the requirements of California's "Wende procedure" to the
California Court of Appeal. ' 2 The court excused Robbins's
attorney. So, like Charlie Anders, Robbins took up his own case
and filed a pro se brief with the court alleging that there was
insufficient evidence to support his conviction."' Finding no
support in the record for Robbins's arguments, the California
Court of Appeal denied his appeal." 4 The California Supreme
Court thereafter

refused

his petition

for review. ' 5 After

exhausting his state remedies, Robbins sought relief in the
federal courts by way of a habeas corpus petition."6
Along with a number of alleged trial errors, Robbins argued
to the federal district court that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel because his appointed state appellate

11.See Smith, 528 U.S. at 266; see also Robbins v. Smith, 152 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th
Cir. 1997) (opinion amended Aug. 13, 1998).
112. The Court summarized the Wende procedure as follows:
[C]ounsel, upon concluding that an appeal would be frivolous, files a brief with
the appellate court that summarizes the procedural and factual history of the
case, with citations of the record. He also attests that he has reviewed the record,
explained his evaluation of the case to his client, provided the client with a copy
of the brief, and informed the client of his right to file a pro se supplemental
brief. He further requests that the court independently examine the record for
arguable issues. Unlike under the Anders procedure, counsel following Wende
neither explicitly states that his review has led him to conclude that an appeal
would be frivolous (although that is considered implicit) nor requests leave to
withdraw. Instead he is silent on the merits of the case and expresses his
availability to brief any issues on which the court might desire briefing.
Smith, 528 U.S. at 265 (internal citations omitted); see also People v. Wende, 600 P.2d
1071 (Cal. 1979) (en banc).
113. See Smith, 528 U.S. at 267.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
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counsel failed to present his claims in accordance with Anders."7
Finding an Anders violation, the district court ordered California
to grant Robbins a new appeal or release him from custody. ' 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court on the Anders issue, stating that
Anders "set forth the exclusive procedure through which
appointed counsel's performance can pass constitutional
muster." "' It remanded the case, however, for the district court
to consider Robbins's claims of trial error.' 20 The Supreme Court
then granted certiorari.
2. The Court's Decision
After examining the development of the Anders procedure,
Justice Thomas devoted a full section of the Court's decision to
quieting the Ninth Circuit's and legal commentators' speculation2
that the Anders procedure was obligatory upon the states.
While acknowledging that cases subsequent to Anders may have
included language that could be misinterpreted, 3 the Court
minimized Anders's perceived mandatory effect, and, relying on
principles of federalism, stated,
[A]ny view of the procedure we described in... Anders
that converted it from a suggestion into a straitjacket would
contravene our established practice.., of allowing the
117. See id. Robbins argued that the following errors occurred at trial: (1) The
prosecutor violated his duty to disclose exculpatory evidence; (2) the court erred by failing
to allow Robbins to withdraw the waiver of his right to counsel; (3) the court failed to
provide him with either the money or the means to prepare a case in his own defense; and
(4) the court deprived him of his right to a fair trial by failing to secure the presence of the
witnesses he had subpoenaed. See Smith, 152 F.3d at 1064-65.
118. See Smith, 528 U.S. at 268; see also Smith, 152 F.3d at 1065. The district court
identified two issues that should have been raised on appeal: first, whether the prison law
library was adequate to support Robbins's efforts as a pro se defendant; and second,
whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to withdraw his waiver of counsel.
See Smith, 528 U.S. at 268.
119. Smith, 152 F.3d at 1066.
120. See Smith, 528 U.S. at 269; see also Smith, 152 F.3d at 1069.
121. 526 U.S. 1003 (1999).
122. See Smith, 528 U.S. at 270-76.
123. See id. at 272 ("We did, in McCoy, describe the procedure at issue as going 'one
step further' than Anders, thus suggesting that Anders might set a mandatory
minimum .... ") (internal citation omitted); id. ("It is true that in Penson we used some
language suggesting that Anders is mandatory upon the States ....
).
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States wide discretion... to experiment with solutions to
difficult problems of policy. 124
In concluding that portion of the opinion, the Court expressly
held that "the Anders procedure is merely one method of
satisfying the reiuirements of the Constitution for indigent
criminal appeals."

Having determined that non-compliance with Anders was
not fatal to California's Wende procedure, the Court moved to an
examination of the procedure on its own merits."6 After
examining the Wende procedure against the backdrop of its prior
line of relevant cases, the Court found it to be constitutionally
satisfactory. 27 First, the Court was swayed by the fact that the
Wende procedure, unlike prior cases found to be inadequate
under Anders, required both counsel and the court to make a
frivolity determination before withdrawal.'28 Second, the Wende
procedure was free from the Douglas violation problem
encountered in Penson of an appellate court permitting counsel
to withdraw before undertaking its own review of the record and
thereafter deciding the case without appointing new counsel.'2 9
Finally, the Court found that the Wende procedure's two tiers of
review provided sufficient procedural protections, unlike the
singular review procedures reviewed in prior cases. 30 The Court
ultimately held that the Wende procedure, "like the Anders and
McCoy procedures, and unlike the ones in Ellis, Eskridge, Lane,
Douglas, and Penson, affords adequate and effective appellate
review for criminal indigents." ''
The Court remanded the case for clarification and
adjudication of the non-frivolous appellate issues. For Robbins's
contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the
124. Id.
125. Id. at 276. The Court went on to say, "States may-and, we are confident, willcraft procedures that, in terms of policy, are superior to, or at least as good as, that in
Anders. The Constitution erects no barrier to their doing so." Id.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 278-79.
128. See id. at 279-80.
129. See id. at 280 ("Under Wende.... Douglas violations do not occur, both because
counsel does not move to withdraw and because the court orders briefing if it finds

arguable issues.").
130. See id. at 279-81.
131. Smith, 528 U.S. at 284 (referring to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)).
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Court directed that the Strickland standard be used to evaluate
his claim.'32 The Court decided that the Strickland analysis was
appropriate because the Wende procedure was constitutional,
thus eliminating the issue of whether Robbins was afforded his
right to counsel on appeal.'33 The only issue was therefore
whether Robbins could prove that he was actually prejudiced by
counsel's performance. Because the Court found that Robbins
was afforded his right to counsel on appeal, it "presume[d] that
the result of the proceedings on appeal [was] reliable, and...
require[d] Robbins to prove the presumption incorrect in his
particular case." 114
3. The Dissents
Justice Stevens authored the first dissent, which Justice
Ginsburg joined. Justice Stevens wrote separately to highlight
two points concerning the majority's decision: first, that the
majority had effectively overruled Anders and Penson; ' and
second, that in his view, the majority had inexplicably
disregarded the Court's precedent set in McCoy.'36 Justice
Stevens drew heavily on his prior experience as a practicing
attorney and appellate judge in concluding that requiring counsel
to "put pen to paper" may yield formerly reclusive viable legal
issues on appeal.'
Justice Souter's lengthier dissent garnered the support of
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. In the first portion of his
dissent, Justice Souter set forth to make the case for Anders and
distinguish its staunch protection of the adversarial system from
the overly-permissive guideline prescribed to the states by the
majority. Second, while stating that the Court has not held
132. See id. at 285-86.
133. Cf Penson, 488 U.S. at 88-89 (establishing a presumption of prejudice where there
is an altogether denial of counsel on appeal as of right).
134. Smith, 528 U.S. at 287.
135. See id. at 289 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 291 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Justice Souter wrote:
It is owing to the importance of assuring that an adversarial, not an inquisitorial,

system is at work that I disagree with the Court's statement today that our cases
approve of any state procedure that "reasonably ensures that an indigent's
appeal will be resolved in a way that is related to the merit of that appeal." A
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Anders to contain an exclusive procedure, Justice Souter
characterized it as a "benchmark" and concluded that the Wende
procedure "fail[ed] to measure up" because it did not require
counsel to raise arguable issues in a no-merit brief, which in turn
made more difficult the court's search of the record for arguable
issues.'39 Finally, because he viewed the invocation of the Wende
procedure as tantamount to a denial of counsel on appeal, Justice
Souter concluded that prejudice should be 40 presumed, thereby
eliminating the need for Strickland analysis.'
II. DISCUSSION
The Smith Court gave short shrift to the notion that the
procedure detailed in Anders was binding on the states. But an
appreciation of the historical context of Anders and a review of
the text of the Anders opinion lend considerable support to the
conclusion that the procedure was in fact mandatory.' 4' Smith
therefore constitutes a radical change in the Court's approach.
As for the historical context of Anders, around the time
Anders was announced, the United States Supreme Court was
routinely imposing new rules of criminal procedure on the
purely inquisitorial system could satisfy that criterion, and so could one that
appoints counsel only if the appellate court deems it useful. But we have rejected
the former and have explicitly held the latter unconstitutional, the reason in each
case being that the Constitution looks to the means as well as to the ends.
Id. at 296 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
139. Id. at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting) (" Wende... requires no indication of conceivable
issues and hence nothing specifically reviewable by a court bound to preserve the system's
adversary character. Wende does no more to protect the indigent's right to advocacy than
the no merit letter condemned in Anders, or the conclusory statement disapproved in
Penson.").
140. See id. at 300-01 (Souter, J., dissenting).
141. This was the Ninth Circuit's view. Smith, 152 F.3d at 1066 ("Anders and Douglas
thus set forth the exclusive procedure .... "). This perception was also reflected recently in
State v. Mouton, 653 S.2d 1176 (La. 1995) (per curiam). A Louisiana lower appellate court
had held that Louisiana had a "higher standard of constitutional protection than that offered
by the Anders brief." State v. Mouton, 653 S.2d 1360, 1361 (La. App. 1995). The court
said that Anders "effectively wipes out defendant's right to counsel on appeal and forces
the judiciary to become his advocate." Id. at 1362. In reversing, the Louisiana Supreme
Court noted that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a case arising
in Louisiana, had previously held that strict adherence to Anders is constitutionally required
and concluded that Louisiana's appellate courts could not deviate from Anders. See
Mouton, 653 S.2d at 1176-77 (citing State v. Benjamin, 573 S.2d 528 (La. App. 1990),
which relied on Lofton v. Whitley, 905 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1990)).
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states. The new rules included broad mandates that certain
provisions in the Bill of Rights be enforced in state criminal
cases, e.g., the privilege against self-incrimination," the right to
a speedy trial,"- the right to confront witnesses,' 44 and the right to
compulsory process. '4, There were also cases that spelled out
specific rules that states had to follow as a matter of federal
constitutional law, e.g., the content of the harmless error rule,'46
specific procedural requirements in juvenile cases,' 47 and a
specific rule extending the right to counsel to a defendant facing
a lineup. 4" Given this context, Anders could easily be read as yet
another mandated procedure.
In addition, the text of Anders is not in the form of a
suggested procedure. In other cases where the Court has merely
suggested a new procedure, it has expressly stated that other
alternatives would be constitutionally acceptable.' 49 Anders, in
contrast, stated that a motion to withdraw "must... be
accompanied by a brief." , The Court also stated that if the
appellate court finds the appeal to be frivolous, the court can
allow counsel to withdraw "and dismiss the appeal insofar as
federal requirements are concerned," '' and that if the court
finds any arguable issues the court "must, prior to a decision,
afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the
appeal." 52 Anders then went on to describe the procedure
outlined as a "requirement" designed to "assure penniless
defendants the same rights and opportunities on appeal.., as are

142. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1963).
143. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
144. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
145. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
146. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22-24.
147. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. I(1967).
148. See U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
149. See e.g. id. at 239. There, the Court held that counsel is required at a lineup because
a lineup is a "critical stage." See id. The Court, however, said that other procedures that
"eliminate the risks" of suggestive identification proceedings may render the lineup less
"critical." Id. Citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court said, "What we
hold today in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts
at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect." Wade, 388 U.S. at 239.
150. Anders v. California,386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
15 I.
152. Id. (emphasis added).
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enjoyed by those... able to afford the retention of private
counsel."
Justice Stewart's dissent also understood the procedure to
be mandatory. He initially referred to the Anders brief as a
"requirement" and then as a "quixotic requirement imposed by
the Court." '
More fundamentally, he wondered how "the
procedure that the Court commands" was better than
California's then-current procedure.'55 Finally, he disagreed with
the "implicit assertion that there can be a single inflexible
answer" to the issue, which further indicates that he understood
the Court's procedure to be mandatory.'56
The Court reinforced the notion that Anders was mandatory
in McCoy. There, the Court recognized the dilemma of
appointed counsel who, unlike retained counsel, cannot
withdraw from a frivolous appeal, but neither can she ethically
brief a frivolous issue.'57 The Court resolved the dilemma by
directing counsel to err on the side of informing the court of the
frivolity of her client's appeal.'5 8 McCoy went on to refer to the
Anders brief as a requirement 9 and the Wisconsin rule as
simply going "one step further" than "the minimum
requirements of Anders.",60
McCoy thus not only stood for the proposition that Anders
is constitutionally mandated, it also acknowledged that there is
only one acceptable solution to the ethical dilemma-that
counsel must inform the appellate court of her conclusion that
the appeal is frivolous. 6' This holding goes beyond Anders and
beyond what is constitutionally required. Whether appellate
counsel is required to inform the court that her client's appeal is
15 4

153. Id. at 745.
154. Id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
156. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
157. McCoy 11, 486 U.S. at 437.
158. Id. (citing Ellis v. U.S., 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958)) ("It is well settled... that this
dilemma must be resolved by informing the court of counsel's conclusion.").
159. See id. at 439 ("That requirement was designed..."); ("The Anders requirement
assures..); see also id. at 442 ("[Anders] held that the attorney was required to
submit. .
160. Id. at 442.
161. Both the majority and the dissent in McCoy 11 stated that counsel must advise the
court of her determination that her client's appeal is frivolous. See id. at 447 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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frivolous is a matter of state law, not federal constitutional
"' Nonetheless, McCoy purports to dictate how appellate
law. 62
defense counsel in all fifty states must handle this ethical
dilemma.
The seven-member majority in Penson was equally firm
concerning Anders. The majority said that Anders permitted
withdrawal "provided that certain safeguards are observed" and
went on to repeat, in detail, the Anders procedure.'63 The Court
then carefully went through the procedure used by the Ohio
courts, compared it jot for jot with Anders, and found that it did
not comply with the Anders requirements. The clear import of
this analysis was that any deviation from Anders would not be
tolerated.
The majority's rigid approach was underscored by the
concurring and dissenting opinions. Justice O'Connor agreed
with the result on these facts, but would not grant relief for "a
mere technical violation of Anders." '6 In dissent, Chief Justice
Rehnquist said that the majority had "engraft[ed] onto...
Anders... a presumption of prejudice when the appellate
attorney for an indigent does not exactly follow the procedure
laid down in that case." 165 Thus, after Penson, it appeared that
the entire Court regarded Anders as the template against which
the Court would measure the states' handling of frivolous
appeals in indigent criminal cases.
Smith, decided twelve years after Penson and McCoy, is
thus a major change in the Court's approach. The majority in
Smith, however, did not view it that way. Instead, the majority
stated that while McCoy "suggest[ed] that Anders might set a
mandatory minimum," this characterization had to be viewed in
the context of the Wisconsin procedure under review and, as
such, was "questionable." 166 As for Penson, the majority
admitted that there was "some language suggesting that Anders
162. See State v. Balfour, 814 P.2d 1069, 1078 (Or. 1991) (en banc) ("[T]he [United
States] Supreme Court is not the arbiter of ordinary questions of ethical practices for

attorneys in state court, except where those ethical practices implicate federal constitutional
concerns."); State v. Clark, 2 P.3d 89, 96 (Ariz. App. 1999) ("[I]t is up to the states to

determine the proper ethical rules for attorneys practicing within their jurisdiction.").
163.
164.
165.
166.

Penson, 488 U.S. at 80.
Id. at 89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 90 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Smith, 528 U.S. at 272.
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is mandatory upon the States.... but that language was not
necessary to the decision." '67The dissenters in Smith agreed that
the Court had never held "the details of Anders to be exclusive
but ...as exemplifying what substantial equality requires."168
The dissent simply viewed Anders as a "benchmark." 169 Thus, in
Smith, the Court categorically denied that it ever held Anders to
be mandatory on the states, seemingly disregarding its prior
language and leaning in Anders, McCoy, and Penson.
The overriding theme of Smith is that states now have
exceptionally wide latitude in regulating the performance of
appellate counsel in frivolous cases. Any lingering ambiguity
from Anders has been resolved. States may follow Anders or
Wende, or any other procedure "so long as it reasonably ensures

that an indigent's appeal will be resolved in a way that is related
to the merit of that appeal." 70 At a minimum, this requires a
lawyer, a transcript and, if a state chooses to set up a system that
screens out frivolous criminal appeals, certain substantive and
procedural safeguards within the system.'7 '
First, the screening system must use a criterion of
frivolousness. In other words, it cannot screen out cases that are
arguable but unlikely to succeed on appeal. To use a standard
that demands more than frivolousness would discriminate
167. Id.
168. Id. at 297 (Souter, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 276-77 (citations omitted).
171. For an example of how Smith is being applied, see Hughes v. Booker, 220 F.3d 346,
352 (5th Cir. 2000), where the Fifth Circuit held that Mississippi's "Killingsworth
procedure" failed to provide adequate and effective review to indigent defendants.
Mississippi's withdrawal procedure provided that:
[i]f counsel truly believes an appeal without merit, he may with honor state such
to the Court-although we caution that this be done only in the clearest cases.
Where counsel regards the appeal without merit and deems it his obligation to so
state to the Court, the full protection of the rights of the accused require that he
receive a copy of the representation counsel has made to the Court and be
furnished a reasonable opportunity to file his own comments and raise any
additional points that he chooses.
Killingsworth v. State, 490 S.2d 849, 851 (Miss. 1986). In concluding that the
"Killingsworth procedure" did not comport with Smith, the court found the fact that
counsel is not required to explain the basis for his "no merit" conclusion and is not
required to brief arguably meritorious issues to be fatal. Hughes, 220 F.3d at 351. Further,
it found that the "Killingsworth procedure" failed to provide for state appellate court
review, and did not contain any alternative safeguards to make up for the shortcomings
identified above. Id. at 351-52.
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against the indigent.' Second, the screening mechanisms cannot
allow counsel to withdraw until the court determines that the
appeal is frivolous.'73 And, if the court finds non-frivolous
issues, the court must insist that counsel brief them. 7 4 It cannot
simply decide the merits of the appeal without the assistance of
counsel. 75 Third, the determination as to whether an appeal is
frivolous cannot be left solely to counsel or solely to the court.
is insufficient to
Having one, but not both, review frivolousness
7
1
lawyer.1
effective
an
by
advocacy
guarantee
Provided these safeguards are in place, a State may
establish its own mechanism for pre-screening indigent criminal
appeals. But, just as the Constitution does not require a State to
have a system of appellate review, a State does not have to
establish a system for screening out frivolous criminal appeals.
A State may choose to treat all criminal appeals in the same
manner by insisting that counsel act as an advocate for the
defendant whatever the merits of the appeal. By providing an
indigent with a transcript and a lawyer to brief the issues, the
State guarantees that the indigent will receive the same
representation as an appellant represented by retained counsel.
Counsel will file a brief that addresses the merits and advocates
on the appellant's behalf. Ultimately, this means that the
indigent's case, just like all other cases, will be resolved based
on the merits, which is sufficient to meet the federal
constitutional minimum. This is the approach first suggested by
the ABA and subsequently followed in a number of States.
7
III. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION APPROACH1 1

The ABA approach eliminates the two most controversial
steps that Anders added to the appellate process. Appellate
counsel is not required to inform the court that in her opinion the
172. Smith, 528 U.S. at 279.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 281.
177. The authors wish to express their gratitude and appreciation to Ms. Susan
Hillenbrand and the American Bar Association for their cooperation and assistance in
providing us with the ABA Standards referred to in this article.
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appeal is frivolous, and the court is not required to undertake an
independent review of the record.
This section will review the history of this approach,
discuss its effects on the role of counsel and the court, and argue
that this approach better serves the appellate process.
A. History of the American Bar Association Approach
The Court decided Anders in 1967, three years after the
ABA had launched the formidable effort to write the Standards
for Criminal Justice." The actual Standards came out as
tentative drafts and later as approved drafts accompanied by
comments from the various Advisory Committees.
The first Standardto specifically deal with the Anders issue
was promulgated in July of 1967 in tentative draft form by the
Advisory Committee on the Prosecution and Defense Functions
as part of the Standards Relating to ProvidingDefense Services.
Standard5.3 on Withdrawal of Counsel stated in part:
Counsel should not seek to withdraw because he believes
that the contentions of his client lack merit, but should
present for consideration such points as the client desires to
be raised provided he can do so without compromising
professional standards. "'
The Commentary to this standard cited Anders only in
passing,' 80 but nonetheless criticized the withdrawal procedure as
"cumbersome." 8' The Commentary elaborated on its practical
concern stating that permitting withdrawal by defense counsel
"has ... added to the net burden of judicial and lawyer time." 82
The better procedure, said the Commentary, is for counsel to
present the claim to the court whatever it may be, rather
than file a memorandum in support of a motion to
withdraw .... [T]he presentation of the contentions of his
client, even if lacking in support by authority, when done in
the' manner consistent with his professional obligations
178. See Ray, supra n. 9, at 95.
179. ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services § 5.3 (tentative draft 1967).
180. The only citation to Anders indicated that it was in "accord" with Ellis.
181. Providing Defense Services, supra n. 179, at 51.
182. Id. at 52; see also Doherty, supra n. 9, at 2 (arguing, among other things, that
Anders "will compound the evil of delay in reviewing meritorious appeals").
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fulfills his duty to his client without stultifying his role as
lawyer." 3

In March of 1969, a different committee, the Advisory
Committee on Sentencing and Review, issued a draft of
Standards Relating to CriminalAppeals.' " In the introduction to
these Standards,the Advisory Committee discussed at length the
perceived problem of frivolous appeals. The Committee
expressed doubts about the efficacy of any mechanism designed
to screen out frivolous appeals, flatly stated that "the lawyers'
tactic of requesting permission to withdraw should be
abandoned" ' 85 and concluded that " [g]reat improvement is
possible if appointed counsel would undertake to serve their
clients in the fullest sense, as if retained for a substantial fee.", 16
The text of section 3.2 reflected this view."'
In its Commentary, the Advisory Committee made two
observations: first, that Anders required counsel to "brief the
unbriefable";188

and second, that "the

lawyer [should not]

attempt to undermine his relationship with and duty towards his
client by subtle or open personal disclaimers of any given
argument." 89
Then, in March of 1970, the Advisory Committee on
Prosecution and Defense Functions revisited the issue. The
Committee modified the text of the Standardto read simply that
"[a]ppellate counsel should not seek to withdraw from a case
183. Providing Defense Services, supra n. 179, at 52 (citations omitted).
184. ABA Standards, Criminal Appeals, Introduction at 2 (approved draft 1970).
185. Id.
186. Id. at3.
187. Criminal Appeals, supra n. 184, at 73-74.
188. Id. at 78.
189. See id. Interestingly, section 3.2 was amended prior to approval by the ABA House
of Delegates in October of 1970. The change in fact allowed counsel to withdraw after
filing a brief for her client. See Criminal Appeals, supra n. 184, at 5 (Supp. 1970). The
Commentary stated that while the "Tentative Draft is consistent with Anders,... the
Special Committee views it as significant to state that, in some cases, counsel may
appropriately request leave to withdraw rather than file a suggestion to forego oral
argument." Id. at 6. This "change... is intended to make the standard conform to the
requirements of Anders." Id. This amendment, however, went unnoticed by the Standards
Relating to the Prosecution Function and The Defense Function as approved in 1971. The
most recent Standard restates the position that counsel should not withdraw from a
frivolous appeal and adds that counsel may only withdraw when her only other option is to
mislead the court. See ABA Standards, The Defense Function, Standard 4-8.3, Counsel on
Appeal (approved 1990).
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solely on the basis of his own determination that the appeal lacks
merit." 190 The Commentary repeated the views of the prior
committees and concluded that the better approach is for the
appellate lawyer to present the issues even though they may be
frivolous and not to indicate in any explicit manner that counsel
personally believes the issues are frivolous.
In 1971, the ABA approach was adopted by the highest
courts in two states, Missouri and Colorado.' 9' In Missouri, the
court cited with approval the recommendation that "counsel
present to the court whatever there is to present, recognizing that
in many instances this will amount to a presentation of
contentions that are not well founded in any established case
law." 192 In practical terms, this means that in Missouri, any
attempt by appellate counsel to withdraw because the appeal is
frivolous will be denied.' 93 As applied to this particular case,
where appellate counsel's brief amounted to little more than a
listing of the points previously raised in a motion for a new trial
without any argument, counsel was required to file a new brief
that argued the appeal as well as possible. 94 The Missouri
Supreme Court concluded that "the positions of the Advisory
Committee should be followed, at least until the Supreme Court
of the United States has spoken definitively on the question." '9'
In the Colorado case, the defendant was convicted of
burglary on testimony by two witnesses who saw him leaving
the scene, one of whom apprehended him. His only claim on
appeal was that the evidence was insufficient and that one
witness was " inherently incredible." 196 After recognizing that
this issue was devoid of any merit, the court considered "the
questions of when the Public Defender is required to prosecute
an appeal and the duties which he has on appeal." ,9 The court
190. ABA Standards, The Prosecution Function and the Defense Function (tentative
draft 1970 & approved draft 1971).
191. See State v. Gates, 466 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1971); McClendon v. People, 481 P.2d
715 (Colo. 1971) (en banc).
192. Gates, 466 S.W.2d at 684.
193. See id. ("[AIpplications of counsel to withdraw because the appeal is considered
frivolous will be denied.").
194. See id.

195. Id.
196. McClendon, 481 P.2d at 716.
197. Id. at 717.
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then interpreted Anders to say that "counsel for an accused must

be an advocate and cannot.., cast aside the points urged by the
defendant as being without merit." ,9The court found support
for this interpretation in the ABA Standards, which "gave full
recognition to the points raised in Anders," but defined the
obligations of counsel differently.'" Applying the Standards to
this case, the court found that the Public Defender "carried out
the highest standards of the advocate" by preparing a brief that
raised the issues that the defendant wanted raised.2°° Thus, even
though the issue on appeal was frivolous, counsel's decision to
brief that issue without filing a motion to withdraw satisfied the
defendant's right to effective counsel on appeal.
The next major decision rejecting Anders came in 1977
from the Idaho Supreme Court.2 ' The court did not rely on the
ABA Standards or the opinions from Colorado or Missouri.
Instead, the court relied on its own experience in trying to
implement Anders. The court pointed out that in the McKenney
case itself, appellate counsel had filed an Anders brief along
with a motion to withdraw, that the court had denied the motion
to withdraw because there were "arguable grounds for appeal,"
and that the defendant had personally filed a motion asking that
a new attorney be appointed to represent him.0 2 The court
conceded that this procedure was consistent with Anders, but
saw two problems with it. First, the court stated that the "mere
submission" of a motion to withdraw "result[s] in prejudice."203
Second, the court lamented the "fragmented consideration of
various motions" based on the "impractical and illogical
procedure outlined in Anders dictum."2 0, The court concluded
that if in fact an appeal is frivolous, "less of counsel and the
198. Id. at 717-18.
199. Id. at 718.
200. Id.at 719.

201. See State v. McKenney, 568 P.2d 1213, 1213 (Idaho 1977). Two other courts
rejected Anders shortly after Colorado and Missouri. In State v. Cheelester,488 P.2d 1045
(Utah 1971), the court stated without elaboration its disagreement with Anders. In Dixon v.
State, 284 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. App. 1972), overruled on other grounds, Music v. State, 489
N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 1986), the court discussed McClendon and Gates at length and adopted
the position of the ABA Advisory Committee. See also Hendrixson v. State, 316 N.E.2d
451 (Ind. App. 1974) (expressing agreement with Dixon).
202. McKenney, 568 P.2d at 1213-14.
203. Id. at 1214.
204. Id.
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judiciary's time and energy will be expended in directly
considering the merit of the case in due course."205
Since this decision, a number of states and commentators
have labeled this approach the "Idaho Rule. ' 2°6 Three states
have gone even further by expressly creating an exception to the
rules of professional conduct and allowing counsel to raise
frivolous claims.07 Two states have held that counsel will not be
permitted to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous,
but may in the brief expressly disassociate herself from frivolous
issues. 08 One state has rejected Anders but cautioned lawyers
pursuing frivolous appeals that they might be subject to
sanctions.2 0 And, one state, while eliminating the motion to
205. Id.
206. See e.g. Mendelson, supra n. 9; see also Junkin, supra n. 9.
207. Ramos v. State, 944 P.2d 856 (Nev. 1997) (per curiam); State v. Cigic, 639 A.2d
251 (N.H. 1994); Huguley v. State, 324 S.E.2d 729 (Ga. 1985). It should be noted that the
author, James E. Duggan, served as appellate counsel in the Cigic case.
208. In Commonwealth v. Moffett, 418 N.E.2d 585 (Mass. 1981), the court held that
"counsel should not be permitted to withdraw solely on the ground that the appeal is
frivolous," but stated that "[i]f appointed counsel, on grounds of professional ethics deems
it absolutely necessary to dissociate.., herself from purportedly frivolous points, counsel
may so state in a preface to the brief." Id. at 591. Similarly, in Killingsworth v. State, 490
S.2d 849 (Miss. 1986) (en banc), the court denied counsel's motion to withdraw under
Anders but added, "If counsel truly believes an appeal without merit, he may with honor
state such to the court-although we caution that this be done only in the clearest of
cases." Id. at 851; see supra n. 171 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's rejection of the
Killingsworth procedure).
The situation both courts may have in mind is when the client insists on raising an
issue that is not simply frivolous but irrational-for example that the government cannot
pass laws prohibiting homicide. The issue here is whether counsel must raise such issues
because of the defendant's wishes. The answer under Anders is to allow the defendant to
submit his own pro se supplement to the Anders brief. The answer under the ABA
Standards is that the defendant is represented by counsel who has the final say in issue
selection. Although a case like McClendon indicates that counsel acted appropriately by
raising the frivolous issue that the defendant wanted raised, after Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.
745 (1983), the selection of which issues to raise in an appeal where all the issues are
frivolous would ultimately lie with counsel.
209. See State v. Lewis, 291 N.W.2d 735 (N.D. 1980). In Lewis, counsel filed an Anders
brief. In response the court said that Anders did not apply in North Dakota because there is
a constitutional right to appeal. See id. at 737-38 (quoting N.D. Const. § 90). This means
that the North Dakota Supreme Court has a duty to hear a defendant's appeal without a
preliminary determination of frivolousness. However, if trial counsel concludes the appeal
is frivolous and so informs the court, then the court should appoint another attorney to
handle the appeal "to the best of his ability." Id. at 738. This procedure provides "greater
constitutional protection" than Anders. Id. The court then went on to warn counsel that
sanctions including costs and attorneys' fees are available if an appeal is frivolous. Id. at
738-39.
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withdraw and independent judicial review, requires its own
unique format in frivolous appeals.2 0 In several states, the ABA
approach has been followed de facto, either as a matter of local
rule or practice.2"'

210. State v. Balfour, 814 P.2d 1069, 1080 (Or. 1991) (en banc). Balfour held that if an
appeal is frivolous and the client insists on going forward, counsel should file a two-part
brief. Part A shall contain a statement of the case and the facts but no legal argument. Part
B shall contain the issues the client wants to raise. Appellate counsel may sign part A but
not part B. This way counsel is not "personally" raising frivolous issues. The case is
submitted without oral argument. The court then decides the case as it would any other
appeal. There is no independent review of the record by the court. Balfour holds that this
procedure provides the defendant with "an advocate on the appellant's behalf active to the
permissible ethical limit." Id. at 1081.
211. For a comprehensive and well-documented survey of how the Anders issue is
handled in all jurisdictions, see Warner, supra n. 9. As for states that in practice do not
follow Anders, the article lists:
*
Alaska, where the public defender office does not file Anders briefs. Id. at 651 n. 210
(citing survey response from Clerk of the Alaska Court of Appeals to Martha C.
Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (Jan. 24, 1995)).
"
Hawaii, where the courts do not accept Anders briefs. Id. at 651 n. 206 (citing Hawaii
Appellate Handbook § 8-6 (1988)).
"
Kansas, where there is "an unwritten policy of not accepting Anders briefs." Id. at
651 n. 207 (citing letter from Mary Beck Briscoe, Chief Judge, Kansas Court of
Appeals, to Martha C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June
1, 1994)).
*
Maryland, where the Court of Appeals and public defender office took steps that have
resulted in lawyers not filing Anders briefs. Id. at 651 n. 208 (citing letter from Robert
C. Murphy, Chief Judge, Maryland Court of Appeals, to Martha C. Warner, Judge,
Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 9, 1994)).
"
New Jersey, where the public defender office does not file Anders briefs. Id. at 651 n.
209 (citing letter from Judge Herman D. Michels, Presiding Judge for Administration,
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, to Martha C. Warner, Judge,
Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 8, 1994)).
"
Nebraska, where the Nebraska Supreme Court "abolished its rule allowing counsel to
withdraw from frivolous appeals." Id. at 651 n. 211 (citing letter from William C.
Hastings, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Nebraska, to Martha C. Warner, Judge,
Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 3, 1994)).
•
Maine, where "no, or only sporadic, Anders briefs [have been] filed over the years."
Id. at 651 n. 212 (citing letter from Daniel Wathen, Judge, Maine Supreme Judicial
Court, to Martha C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 9,
1994)).
•
Minnesota, where no Anders briefs are filed "because of its centralized public
defender system." Id. (citing letter from Chief Judge Paul H. Anderson, Minnesota'
Court of Appeals, to Martha C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of
Appeal (June 15, 1994)).
"
Tennessee, where only one Anders brief has been filed in the last 15 years. Id. (citing
survey response from Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals to Martha C. Warner,
Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 20, 1994)).
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By rejecting Anders soon after it was decided, the ABA
Standards gave legitimacy to those critical of the Anders
procedure. The Standards provided an alternative that purported
to satisfy the goals of Anders without its cumbersome
mechanism. The existence of the Standards has allowed a
significant number of states to adopt a process that they believe
provides effective representation and is more suited to the
traditional roles of appellate counsel and the appellate courts.
B. Effects of the American BarAssociation Approach

1. Defense Counsel
While the ABA's recommended approach relieves defense
counsel of her obligation to notify the court that she deems her
client's case frivolous, counsel does not have carte blanche to
ignore her ethical responsibilities. Counsel's conduct remains
governed by the usual ethical and professional constraints and
duties.
In every case, counsel must determine the overall strength
of the appeal and the various issues presented. She must give the
defendant her professional judgment as to the benefits and
likelihood of success on appeal. There are many instances where
appellate counsel might advise the defendant not to pursue an
appeal: for example, where the sentence imposed is more lenient
than expected and counsel fears a harsher sentence if the appeal
is successful,"' or where the cost and complexity of protracted
appellate proceedings outweighs the likelihood of success.
Vermont, where "no, or only sporadic, Anders briefs [have been] filed over the
years." Id. at 651 n. 212 (citing survey response from Vermont Supreme Court to
Martha C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 17, 1994)).
*
West Virginia, where "no, or only sporadic, Anders briefs [have been] filed over the
years." Id. (citing survey response from Margaret C. Workman, Justice, West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, to Martha C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth
District Court of Appeal (June 9, 1994)).
*
Wyoming, where "no, or only sporadic, Anders briefs [have been] filed over the
years." Id. (citing survey response from Wyoming Supreme Court to Martha C.
Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 14, 1994)).
212. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (permitting a harsher sentence
to be imposed in some circumstances after a defendant has successfully attacked his
conviction on appeal). See also Wasman v. U.S., 468 U.S. 559 (1984) (upholding such a
*
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So, too, with the frivolous appeal. Counsel must evaluate
the chances of success and advise the defendant accordingly. If
counsel determines that the appeal is wholly frivolous, ethically
she must advise the defendant to withdraw the appeal.
The reality is that it is often difficult to persuade a client in
a criminal case to withdraw an appeal, especially in indigent
criminal appeals." 3 From the client's perspective, there is little
or nothing to be gained by abandoning the appeal, even when
counsel has advised him that there is only a one-in-a-million
chance of success. For a person serving a lengthy prison
sentence, that is a chance worth taking.
Given this reality, there is the risk that without a duty to
report to the court that an appeal is frivolous, appellate counsel
will fail to make the frivolousness determination. Instead of
confronting the defendant with the bad news, counsel may
simply go ahead and brief the case. Some lawyers may take that
approach. On the other hand, as a practical matter, there is often
an incentive for counsel to genuinely try to persuade her client to
withdraw a frivolous appeal. Counsel will then not have to write
a brief and otherwise prepare the case for appeal. At least for
lawyers who specialize in indigent criminal appeals, and who
often carry heavy caseloads, not having to write a brief frees
them to devote more time to other more meritorious cases. 214
Nonetheless, if the defendant decides not to withdraw the
appeal, the ABA procedure allows counsel to continue in her
traditional role. Counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous
thus has less drastic consequences on her relationship with her
sentence); Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986) (same).
213. While Anders has been applied to appellate counsel who is retained, see e.g.
Cannon v. Berry, 727 F.2d 1020, 1021 (11 th Cir. 1984), in practice retained counsel is
unlikely to file a motion to withdraw. As Justice Souter pointed out in Smith, "Paying
clients generally can fire a lawyer expressing unsatisfying conclusions and will often find a
replacement with a keener eye for arguable issues or a duller nose for frivolous ones."
Smith, 528 U.S. at 294 n. 2 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also McCoy II, 486 U.S. at 451
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (" [Tjhe indigent client has no recourse to a second opinion.").
214. See Pritchard, supra n. 9, at 1168 (arguing that the "onslaught of frivolous appeals

unleashed by Anders" has overburdened appellate lawyers and "ensures that indigent
criminal defendants will receive mediocre appellate representation"). A different view is
that by briefing obviously frivolous issues and waiving oral argument, appellate counsel
"may lull the client-who is often not sent a copy of the government's brief and rarely is
able to come to oral argument-into believing that he is getting a meaningful appeal."
Hermann, supra n. 9, at 716. This point is well taken, provided counsel is not candid with
her client about the merits of the appeal.
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client. Counsel is not required to formally resign as her client's
advocate. She can continue to serve her client in the traditional
attorney-client model.
Of course, this means that defense counsel is permitted to
act unethically. Three courts have frankly acknowledged this by
creating an exception to the ethical prohibition on raising
frivolous issues for counsel handling criminal appeals." 5 States
are, of course, free to define their own ethical boundaries. The
question then is whether states have sacrificed the values
underlying the Rules of Professional Conduct by creating this
exception.
The ban on raising frivolous claims is designed to prevent
counsel from harassing the opposition and wasting the resources
of the judicial system. Neither of those goals is undermined by
an exception in indigent criminal appeals. The opposition-the
state or federal government-incurs additional expense by being
required to respond to a frivolous argument, but this hardly rises
to the level of the harassment the ethical rule targets. In addition,
the court's resources are not being abused because, one way or
another, the court will have to review the issues. In sum, the
underlying goals of the ethical rules are not significantly
compromised by creating an exception for criminal appeals.
2. Better Representation
An analysis of whether the ABA approach provides better
quality representation for the defendant must begin with an
understanding of what constitutes quality representation. To the
individual defendant, the mere fact that his lawyer does not
withdraw midway through the appeal may improve the quality
of the representation. A system where the lawyer remains as the
defendant's advocate will undoubtedly result in less
dissatisfaction among clients.
Quality representation, however, is more than simply the
defendant's subjective feeling about the services provided by his
lawyer. The measure of quality includes whether the lawyer is
able to effectively assist the defendant in attaining his goal of
overturning his conviction or securing some other form of relief

215. See supra n. 207.
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on appeal. In this respect, the ABA approach may have an
important effect on counsel's performance. Requiring counsel to
brief what appears to be unbriefable will sometimes result in an
unexpectedly persuasive argument. As the Supreme Court stated
in Penson, "Simply putting pen to paper can often shed new
light on what may at first appear to be an open-and-closed
issue."" 6 The process of writing a brief on a frivolous issue may
unearth creative arguments. It may force counsel to take a closer
look at the facts or to undertake additional investigation into the
client's allegations. In this regard, the ABA approach may
operate to actually improve the quality of representation
provided.
On the other hand, under the ABA approach there is no
check on counsel's performance because there is no independent
judicial review of the record. If counsel fails to identify a
meritorious issue, there is no appellate court waiting in the
wings to uncover it. Under Anders, independent judicial review
is the safeguard against counsel's failure to find meritorious
issues. No comparable safeguard exists in the ABA approach.
Some courts and commentators, however, question the
value of independent judicial review. One court has said that the
motion to withdraw "prejudices" the court against finding
meritorious issues."7 One commentator has stated that
"counsel's request for withdrawal amounts in practical effect to
a motion for dismissal or affirmance." 2 8 And, with that starting
point, the court's independent review is limited to the record on
appeal. The appellate court cannot consult with trial counsel or
the defendant.
There are cases where such review resulted in finding error
that counsel either did not find or considered frivolous. 19 But
such review is hardly the equal of the trained advocate. Indeed,
the very presence of independent judicial review may encourage
216. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 81 n. 4 (1988). Also, in Smith, Justice Stevens noted:
On a good many occasions I have found that the task of writing out the reasons
that support an initial opinion on a question of law-whether for the purpose of
giving advice to my client or for the purpose of explaining my vote as an
appellate judge-leads to a conclusion that was not previously apparent.
Smith, 528 U.S. at 290 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. State v. McKenney, 568 P.2d 1213, 1214 (Idaho 1977).
218. Ray, supra n. 9, at 110.
219. See e.g. Penson, 488 U.S. at 79.
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counsel not to scrutinize the record as closely as counsel who
knows that she has to write a brief. At the same time, if the court
assumes that counsel has scrutinized the record with the utmost
of care and has found nothing to argue, there is at least a risk
that the defendant will not receive the full benefit of either's
expertise.
In most cases, requiring appellate counsel to brief what
counsel considers to be a frivolous issue will have the same
result as the Anders procedure. But, balanced against the value
of independent judicial review, counsel's efforts are more likely
to uncover potentially meritorious claims.
3. Appellate Courts
One of the reasons for the Anders decision was purportedly
to save courts from expending their full resources in resolving
frivolous appeals. 22 At least one California appellate court, in
describing its procedure under Wende, would agree that the goal
has been met." ' The court said that the Wende process is "a
streamlined and swift affair.""22 When appointed counsel files a
Wende brief, the other side either files no brief or files a pro
forma brief. There is no oral argument. The court reviews the
record, finds no issues, and issues a "written opinion...
'
The
consist[ing] of only several boilerplate paragraphs."223
"opinion is produced on a word processor with a minimum
number of keystrokes." 2 24 The result is "an opinion that is filed
and final much sooner than one
225 in an appeal that proceeds in the
more conventional manner."

But other courts that have rejected Anders have said that
221
doing so saves a substantial amount of appellate court time.
220. See Junkin, supra n. 9, at 187. ("[Tihe [Anders] procedure promotes efficiency by
providing a means for appellate courts to dispose of frivolous appeals with minimal
expenditure of judicial resources." ).
221. In re Andrew B., 40 Cal. App. 4th 825 (1995).
222. Id. at 829.

223. Id.
224. Id. n. 3.

225. Id. at 830.
226. In Lewis, the court stated, "We also are aware of the substantial saving of appellate
court time due to the elimination of the initial supreme court determination of whether or
not the appeal is frivolous. The elimination of the double procedure will also conserve
county funds." 291 N.W.2d at 783.
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Another court stated that sorting through the issues in the Anders
brief, reading the record looking for additional issues, deciding
whether those issues are frivolous or arguable, and then having
counsel brief the new issues is time-consuming and
complicated.227
Whether the ABA approach or the Anders process is more
efficient may depend on local practice. One factor may be the
availability of personnel to read the record. Another may be
whether the court is required to write an opinion in every case or
whether it can summarily dispose of obviously frivolous
appeals.228
Putting the resources issue aside, the issue remains as to the
appropriateness of an appellate court reviewing the record on the
defendant's behalf. Requiring a court to take on the mantle of
the defendant's advocate is at odds with the neutrality of the
court. It requires the court to read the record in a new and
different way. The court is not looking simply for error, but
rather, is looking for ways that a creative criminal defense
lawyer can argue that reversible error exists. This involves
thinking about precedent with one eye towards extending it in
favor of a defendant's rights. But the judge who is reading the
record is not trained to think about precedent that way and may
have purposely worked to de-program himself of this method of
thinking when he moved from the bar to the bench. In fact, the
arguments that an experienced criminal defense attorney may
consider plausible, a judge may regard as at odds with the
direction he thinks the law should take. Thus, for a court to

227. See McKenney, 568 P.2d at 1214.
228. One commentator has questioned the efficiency of the ABA approach.

Adoption of the Idaho Rule and prohibiting all withdrawals would sacrifice the
efficiency achieved by Anders. The Idaho Rule does not account for cases so
obviously frivolous that it would be useless for counsel to argue for reversal and
inefficient for a court to expend the resources needed to formally address the

issues in any extended manner.
Junkin, supra n. 9, at 195. This, of course, is accurate if the appellate court is required to
write an opinion in every case. Otherwise, the ABA approach allows the court to identify
obviously frivolous cases based on the briefs and summarily affirm without oral argument.
Cf. Gale v. United States, 429 A.2d 177, 183 n. 12 (D.C. 1981) (per curiam) (Ferren, J.,

dissenting) (arguing that abandoning Anders in favor of the Idaho Rule "would have little
effect on the time of the court or counsel" but acknowledging there would be some impact
on the local prosecutor's resources).
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assume the role of defense counsel is undermined by its usual,
natural role.22 9

Moreover, the judge who must review the record and cull
out meritorious issues must later decide the issues. The same
court must then switch back to its neutral role and declare
whether the issue which it found to be meritorious merits
reversal. While it is theoretically possible for a judge to do this,
it puts the judge in the position of arguing against himself.23°
Ultimately, the value of independent review must be
measured against the goals of the appellate process. One goal is
to identify those cases where reversible error has occurred. The
traditional method for achieving that goal relies on the effective
advocacy of appellate counsel. The Anders procedure allows
counsel to abandon her advocacy without requiring counsel to
attempt to write a merits brief. Counsel can simply decide an
appeal is frivolous and assume the court will act as a safety net.
The court of course assumes that defense counsel has thoroughly
reviewed the record and found no issues. Neither defense
counsel nor the court is acting as normally envisioned by the
229. As Judge Ferren explained in his dissent in Gale, "[Tihe Anders dictum typically
forces either the court to undertake the role of the lawyer, or the lawyer to undertake the
role of the court. This role reversal does not well serve the administration of justice." See
id. at 178-83. Judge Ferren urged the adoption of the Idaho Rule, stating, "[I]f an appellant
is entitled to the appointment of counsel, then that appellant is entitled to the full benefit of
the adversary system; and, in any event, the Anders compromise does not work well
because it forces lawyers and courts to undertake ill-fitting roles." Id. at 182 n. 10. He
concluded that
[t]he adversary system has served the administration of justice long and well. It
is the best system we know for producing results that are reliable, credible and
fair. Motions to withdraw under Anders, by contrast, are agonizing for the
lawyer, awkward for the judge, and perceived as collusive by the appellant.
Id. at 183.
230. Gale is also an excellent example of the difficulty in being both an advocate for the
defendant and a judge of the merits of the case. There, the majority granted counsel's
motion to withdraw under Anders. See id. at 177. Judge Ferren, however, found two nonfrivolous issues. He reviewed the record and persuasively argued that there was insufficient
evidence on the Burglary I charge because there was little or no evidence that a resident
was present in the apartment at the time of the burglary as required by the Burglary I
statute. He argued that similar arguments had prevailed in other cases and that in an
"analogous context" of proof of value in larceny cases, the court had been persuaded to
adopt a "rigid rule of proof." Id. at 180. He then went on to argue that appellate review of
the sufficiency claim may not be barred by trial counsel's failure to raise this issue because
there was "a serious question" of ineffectiveness presented. Id. Having taken great pains to
construct an argument on the defendant's behalf out of whole cloth, if review had been
granted, Judge Ferren would then have had to objectively evaluate his own argument.
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adversary system. This structure-far from ensuring effective
assistance of counsel-may create a risk that counsel is less
effective and that reversible error remains uncovered in the
process.
As one judge who has extensively studied the Anders issue
said,
If the ultimate fairness of the proceeding is determined by
the effectiveness of counsel in representing the defendant,
then the goal should be to compel full representation
through appeal and not to allow for that representation to be
avoided. Thus, those states that refuse to allow withdrawal
of counsel on the ground that the appeal is frivolous more
effectively provide the right than do those that allow
counsel to withdraw. 3
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Smith is a radical departure from its prior decisions in Anders,
McCoy, and Penson. The departure allows states to deviate from
Justice Clark's seemingly mandatory procedure for handling
frivolous indigent criminal appeals.
The procedure suggested in the ABA Standards overcomes
many of the deficiencies present in Anders and strikes the
closest balance between counsel's duty to her client and ethical
duties as an officer of the court. It is arguably more efficient
because it eliminates independent judicial review, is certainly
more consistent with the traditional roles of appellate counsel
and appellate judges, and may improve the quality of
representation afforded to indigent appellants.
The Court's decision in Smith liberates states that have
followed Anders blindly under the misconception that they were
required to do so and frees them to serve as laboratories for
alternative procedures, such as the ABA approach endorsed by
this article.

231. Warner, supra n. 9, at 661-62.

